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Abstract - This paper provides an overview of the evolution of interregional 
income disparities among 304 regions from 27 OECD countries between 1995 
and  2005.  This  sample  of  regions  allows  to  compare  interregional  income 
inequality  in  different  economic  integration  systems:  the  USA  (used  as  an 
example of a political union), the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU),  the  European  Union  (EU),  and  the  North-American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Overall, interregional income inequality is lower among 
US states and EMU regions than among EU regions and NAFTA regions. Thus, 
interregional  income  inequality  seems  to  be  negatively  related  to  economic 
integration. However, income inequality has risen among US states, while it has 
been stable among OECD regions, and has even decreased among European 
regions.  Moreover,  rank-size  scatterplots  suggest  that  inequality  is  higher 
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This paper aims at a better understanding of the impact of economic and 
monetary integration on regional income inequality. The current literature offers 
various and often conflicting models to explain whether regional disparities will 
disappear with further economic and monetary integration. For proponents of 
neoclassical  precepts,  income  disparities  are  bound  to  disappear  because  of 
diminishing returns to factors of production. Diminishing returns to factors of 
production imply that these returns are higher in poorer countries/regions where 
factor  endowments  are  lower.  Consequently,  factor  endowments  and  output 
should  grow  faster  in  poorer  countries/regions,  leading  to  decreasing  inter-
regional  income  disparities.  By  promoting  free  movement  of  factors  of 
production,  further  integration  would  lead  to  a  more  efficient  resource 
allocation,  factor  price  equalization  and,  thus,  to  lower  wage  and  income 
inequality. Using cross-section data for 24 countries and US states from the 
1950s and early 1960s, Williamson (1965), for instance, shows that regional 
income inequality follows Kuznet's inverted-U pattern, and that the initial rise 
in inequality is due to the concentration of income-generating factors in core 
regions. Overtime, the diffusion of these income-generating factors leads to a 
progressive  decline  in  interregional  income  inequality.  Therefore,  for 
neoclassical  economists,  persistent  regional  disparities  are  caused  by  factor 
market imperfections, such as low interregional labor mobility, labor market 
rigidities. Until the 1970s, the neoclassical view seemed to be corroborated by 
the experience of most developed countries. However, the recent upsurge in 
inequality among many of these same countries (such as the US) has thrown 
into  question  conventional  economic  theory  and  sent  scholars  searching  for 
explanation. 
 
To  contrast  with  this  approach,  contributions  to  the  new  economic 
geography (NEG) theory argue that, by promoting trade and factor mobility, 
deeper economic integration (captured by reduction in trade barriers) will create 
new opportunities of economies of scale, activity specialization, and economic 
agglomeration,  which  could  generate  regional  disparities  in  growth,  factor 
accumulation,  and  thus  in  income  (Krugman,  1991a,b  ;  Fujita  et  al.,  1999; 
Martin,  2002  ;  Brühlart  and  Tortensson,  1996  ;  Puga,  1999).  Moreover,  by 
inducing deeper industrial specialization within the economic system, economic 
integration might increase the risk of asymmetric shocks (Midelfart et al., 2003; 
Ardy et al., 2002). 
 
Optimal  Currency  Area  theory  (Kenen,  1969  ;  Mundell,  1961; 
McKinnon,  1962  ;  Mongeli,  2002)  considers  that  monetary  integration 
embodied in the adoption of a common currency brings both advantages and 
disadvantages.  Lower  transaction  costs  provide  more  price  transparency  and 
less exchange rate uncertainty, which ultimately promotes economic growth in 
the  monetary  union.  But  the  absence  of  independent  exchange  rate  and 
monetary policy would make it harder to tackle national or regional asymmetric 
shocks, which could increase interregional inequalities. 
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The empirical literature has not yet eliminated these theoretical doubts 
about the effects of economic integration. Among the studies using microdata to 
construct  inequality  indices,  Mahler  et  al.  (1999)  find  that  economic 
globalization (measured as exports, imports, and investment) is not an important 
factor in explaining the recent trends in personal income inequality in developed 
countries. Yet, using macroeconomic data, Ben-David (1993) concludes that 
convergence among European countries belonging to the European Economic 
Community coincided with the introduction of trade reforms (deeper economic 
integration). Thus, the debate on the relationship between economic integration 
and income inequality is far from being closed. 
 
To assess the impact of economic and monetary integration on regional 
disparities,  this  paper  investigates  the  evolution  of  interregional  income 
inequality among 304 OECD regions between 1995 and 2005. The experiences 
of the United States, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
European  Union  (EU),  and  the  North-American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(NAFTA) provide a very useful arena for examining the link between economic 
and  monetary  integration  and  interregional  income  inequality.  The  most 
integrated system of a political union is illustrated with the case of the United 
States, while NAFTA corresponds to the lowest level of economic integration, 
and  EMU  and  the  EU  correspond  to  intermediate  levels  of  integration. 
Understanding  whether  deeper  economic  integration  amplifies  or  reduces 
interregional inequality is especially critical for the EU which devotes a large 
fraction of its budget (36% of its 2007-2013 budget) to its cohesion policy. 
International relations scholars indeed argue that EU cohesion policy has been 
used to compensate member states for the “widening” and the “deepening” of 
European integration (Allen, 2005; Molle, 2007). 
 
First,  the  overall  level  of  interregional  income  inequality  is  measured 
with indices commonly used to study personal income disparities (Atkinson, 
2003; Partridge et al., 1996; Beblo and Knaus, 2001; Heshmati, 2004). Overall 
inequality evaluates inequality within a system such as a set of regions. A low 
level of overall inequality is associated with regional convergence, even though 
the  former  does  not  provide  any  information  about  the  regional  dynamics 
behind  the  convergence  process.  A  decline  in  interregional  inequality, 
especially  within  the  most  integrated  economic  systems,  would  provide 
empirical support to the the neoclassical theory, while an increase in inequality 
would  highlight the relevance  of  the  NEG  model.  Furthermore,  because the 
neoclassical model assumes free mobility of factors of production, persistence 
in inequality within a system might not invalidate the neoclassical theory but 
merely indicates that the underlying assumptions of the theory are not satisfied. 
Insofar as the analysis conducted in this paper offers only stylized facts about 
interregional inequality within different economic systems and does not control 
for  other  factors  that  could  affect  inequality  (such  as  regional  redistributive 
policies,  asymmetric  economic  shocks,  etc...),  it  does  not  allow  us  to  draw 
strong  conclusions  on  the  impact  of  economic  integration  on  interregional 
inequality. Instead, this paper presents some stylized facts that would need to be 
explained by further research relying on more rigorous econometrical analysis. 42   Florence Bouvet 
 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Rey (2001), overall inequality measures 
can mask important development within the distribution. To address this issue, I 
check whether within or between-country inequalities drive inequality among 
OECD  regions.  I  also  expand  the  rank-size  function  to  estimate  whether 
inequality varies with a region's rank within the income distribution. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the 
data set and the methodology used to measure interregional inequality among 
OECD  regions.  Section  2  presents  the  evolution  of  interregional  income 
inequality among OECD regions and within the economic systems these regions 
belong to. Section 3 looks at the variation in inequality between and within 
countries members of these economic systems. Finally, the conclusion sum-
marizes the main findings and discusses further research agenda. 
 
1.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
  
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive account of 
the  evolution  of  regional  income  inequality  within  the  four  aforementioned 
economic  systems,  and  of  the  possible  relationship  between  economic 
integration and interregional income inequality. Regional income is measured as 
GDP per capita in USD constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year 2000. 
These  data  are  obtained  from  the  OECD  Regional  Statistics. The  series  are 
calculated by the OECD Secretariat based on the GDP at current prices divided 
by the Gross Domestic Product Annual Deflator (base 2000 = 100) and by the 
2000 PPP rate. The results are GDPs per capita expressed in US$ comparable 
across countries and over time. Because price data are based on GDP deflators, 
they account only for differences in the costs of living across countries, not 
across regions. As a result, the inequality measures presented below are likely to 
overstate within-country inequality, as poorer regions also tend to have lower 
costs of living. 
 
The  OECD  data  set  covers  the  1990-2006  period,  but  the  number  of 
observations varies by country: data are available for US states only from 1997 
to 2005, from 1997 to 2004 for Mexican states, and from 1995 to 2005 for most 
European countries. The analysis presented below includes 27 OECD countries
1 
and their 304 regions (a list of these countries and their disaggregation in 
regions is presented in appendix A). Regions in OECD Member Countries have 
been  classified  according  to  two  territorial  levels  (TL ).  The  higher  level 
(Territorial Level 2) consists of about 335 macro-regions while the lower level 
(Territorial Level 3) is composed of 1681 micro-regions. The analysis presented 
in this paper is based on regions defined as Territorial Level 2. This class i-
fication  which, for European countries, is largely consistent with the Eurostat 
classification  facilitates greater comparability of regions at the same territorial 
level. The differences with the Eurostat NUTS classification concern Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands for which the analysis is based on NUTS 
1 regions. 
                                                 
1Turkey, Iceland, and New Zealand are excluded from the analysis because their data availability 
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Before using the per capita income data to compute inequality measures, 
one can get a sense of the extent of income disparities among OECD countries 
and regions by considering the summary statistics presented in table 1. At the 
regional level, Oslo in Norway was the richest region of the sample in 1997, 
and had a per capita income 16.4 times higher than the income of Oaxaco in 
Mexico, which was the poorest region in 1997. The discrepancy between the 
richest and poorest regions was even larger in 2004, as the per capita income in 
Brussels (Belgium) amounted to 18.6 times the income of Chiapas, Mexico. At 
the country level, the income ratios between the richest country (Luxembourg) 
and the poorest one (Mexico) were smaller than those observed among regions, 
and were equal to 5.67 and 6.70 in 1997 and 2004 respectively. 
 
Table  1: Summary Statistics 
    
    Highest per capita income 
(in real PPP $) 
Lowest per capita income 
(in real PPP $) 
Mean 
(in real PPP $) 
Standard deviation 
(in real PPP $) 
Regions         
1997  Oslo (Norway): $50,419  Oaxaco (Mexico): $3,068  $20,950  $9,031 
2004  Brussels (Belgium): $63,879  Chiapas (Mexico): $3,429  $26,759         $11,526 
Countries         
1997  Luxembourg: $41,987  Mexico: $7,400  $22,172  $7,870 
2004  Luxembourg: $56,122  Mexico: $8,371  $26,054  $9,658 
Source: elaboration on data from OECD Regional Statistics. 
 
To  analyze  the  implication  of  economic  integration  for  interregional 
income inequality among OECD countries and regions, we first need to classify 
the economic systems made of OECD countries according to their levels of 
economic integration. The five levels of integration are illustrated in figure 1, 
and can be described as follows :   
 
• Free trade area   
   - All barriers to trade of goods/services are removed  
   - Each country allowed to determine non-member policy  
  
• Customs Union   
   - Eliminates trade barriers between member countries  
   - Adopts common external trade policy  
  
• Common Market   
   - No barriers to trade among member countries  
   - Common external trade policy  
   - Allows factors of production to mover freely among members  
  
• Economic Union   
   - Free flow of products and factors of production  
   - Adoption of common external trade policy  
   - Requires common currency, harmonization of tax rates, common monetary 
and fiscal policy  
  
• Political Union   
   - Central political apparatus coordinates economic, social and foreign policy 
of members. 44   Florence Bouvet 
 
 
Figure  1: Levels of economic integration 
 
        Source: Rodrigue (2006). 
 
Among OECD countries and economic systems, I use the US states to 
illustrate  the  case  of  a  complete  political  union
2. While the other OECD 
countries can be categorized as political unions, I chose to use the USA because 
its demographic and economic sizes are comparable to those of the European 
Union. Despite these similarities, the USA and the EU should be compared with 
caution,  as  they  differ  in  their  origin,  age,  institutional  design,  and  their 
economic and social culture. EMU and to a lesser extent the EU represent 
economic unions, while NAFTA (USA, Canada, and Mexico) can be cate -
gorized as a free trade area. Given the years covered in this study, the analysis 
for the EU is based on data for the EU15 countries, while the analysis for EMU 
includes the countries which had adopted the euro by 2001
3. These different 
levels of economic integration reached by OECD countries allow us to compare 
interregional  inequality  in  different  ec onomic  integration  systems.  These 
economic systems differ in many aspects: the depth of the integration, but also 
their  duration,  and  whether  these  systems  involve  countries/states  with 
somewhat similar levels of development (like the US states, the EU or EMU) or 
very different development levels (like NAFTA). 
 
2.  INTERREGIONAL INCOME INEQUALITY IN OECD COUNTRIES 
  
There is a great variety of measures available to inequality scholars, and 
the choice of a measure is always tricky because each measure has its merits 
and  shortcomings.  Scholars  (Cowell,  2000;  Bouguignon,  1979;  López-
Rodríguez and Faiña, 2006; Litchfield, 1999) yet agree on a set of axioms that 
an inequality measure should fulfill: the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, income 
scale dependence, the principle of population, and the symmetry principle (see 
                                                 
2The analysis presented below is based on the 50 states, and excludes the District of Columbia. 
3The euro was adopted in 1999 by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and in 2001 by Greece.      Région et Développement  45 
 
appendix B for more details.) The Gini Index, the General Entropy measure 
with parameter 1 (GE(1), also referred as Theil index) satisfy these four axioms, 
and are therefore used in this paper to assess the level of inequality among 
OECD regions. The formulas used to compute these measures are reported in 
appendix C. 
 
Since the focus of this paper is the analysis of interregional inequality and 
not the analysis of personal income inequality, interregional inequality is not 
weighted  by  regional  population.  As  explained  in  Milanovic,  the  issue  of 
regional  convergence  is  better  captured  by  unweighted  inequality  measures. 
Population-weighted inequality “deals neither only with nations nor individuals 
but  falls  somewhere  in  between.”  (Milanovic,  2005;  page  10).  Using 
unweighted inequality is moreover more relevant to the study of interregional 
inequality  in  Europe,  because,  as  illustrated  by  Article  158  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Community
4 and by EU cohesion policy, the aim of 
the EU is to reduce disparities among regions, not among EU citizens. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the temporal patterns of the Gini and GE(1) indices. 
Before  discussing  the  evolution  of  income  inequality  within  the  different 
economic  systems,  I  first  compare  their  inequality  levels.  Inequality  among 
OECD countries (figure  2(a)) has been lower than inequality among OECD 
regions  (figure  2(b)).  Income  inequality  among  OECD  regions  was  indeed 
150%
5 higher than among OECD countries in 2004. This first observation is not 
surprising  since  national  average  per  capita  GDP  smoothes  out  regional 
disparities. Comparing the different economic systems, inequality has been 
higher among NAFTA regions (figure 2(c)) than among EU and EMU regions 
(figures 2(d) and 2(e)) and US states (figure  2(f)). In 2004, inequality among 
EU regions was 450% higher than among US states, whereas inequality among 
NAFTA regions was 1,158% larger than inequality within the USA. This last 
result is not surprising either given that US states are among the richest OECD 
regions and Mexico has some of the poorest OECD regions. Inequality levels 
differ also between EMU and the EU. In 2004, inequality in per capita GDP was 
253% higher among EU regions than among EMU regions. Overall, there seems 
to exist a negative correlation between inequality in per capita GDP and deeper 
economic integration, which would support the neoclassical theory. 
 
Regarding the evolution of inequality between 1997 and 2004, the GE(1) 
and Gini indices show remarkably similar trends. While inequality has been 
relatively stable among OECD regions (decrease by 1.40% between 1997 and 
2004), cross-country inequality first increased between 1997 and 2000 and then 
decreased until 2004. Inequality among NAFTA regions has increased between 
1997 and 2004 by 2.7%. This finding corroborates Madariaga et al. (2004)'s 
analysis of sigma-convergence between the USA and Mexico which concludes 
that income levels have diverged between the two NAFTA partners. Inequality 
                                                 
4Article 158 of the Treaty establishing the European Community for instance states that “the 
Community shall aim at reducing disparities between levels of development of the various regions 
and the backwardness of the least favored regions or islands, including rural areas”. 
5The statistics provided in this section are based on the GE(1) index. 46   Florence Bouvet 
 
 
has also risen among US states (+5.27% between 1997 and 2004). According to 
Fan  and  Casetti  (1994),  it  has  actually  been  increasing  since  1975.  Further 
research would be necessary to verify whether the implementation of NAFTA is 
partly responsible for the aforementioned increase in interstate inequality. If 
economic integration is indeed responsible for the recent evolution of inequality 
among US states and within NAFTA, then this trend in inequality would not 
support Kuznet's inverted-U hypothesis nor the neoclassical theory, but instead 
would support the predictions of the new economic geography theory. 
 
Figure  2: Overall Inequality 
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As  for  European  regions,  there  has  been  no  significant  differences  in 
inequality within the EU and within EMU. Between 1997 and 2004, inequality 
among EMU regions decreased by 1.5%, while inequality among EU regions 
dropped  by  7.20%.  Using  comparable  data,  Bouvet  (2010)  finds  that 
interregional income inequality has been decreasing among EU regions at least 
since 1977. 
 
How  can  we  reconcile  the  opposite  inequality  trends  in  America  and 
Europe? Because the construction of the United States as a political union is far 
much  older  than  the  period  covered  in  this  paper,  the  observed  increasing 
inequality has probably not been caused by further integration within the USA, 
but may have been caused by other factors, such as the participation of the USA 
into another economic block (i.e. NAFTA), sectoral shifts, or the geographic 
concentration of certain industries (such as high-tech industry in the Silicon 
Valley, and long Route 128 in Boston.) Another possible solution is to consider 
the  extent  of  the  US  and  EU  regional  redistributive  policies.  A  substantial 
regional  redistributive  policy  should  indeed  help  limit  interregional  income 
disparities.  Thus,  interregional  income  inequality  might  be  lower  in  Europe 
owing to a more extensive regional policy than in the USA. While in Europe, 
cohesion policy will account for 35.7% of the total EU budget or 347.41 billion 
euros in 2007-2013 (which represents almost 50 billion euros each year), the US 
federal government spent an annual average of 9 billion dollars on regional 
economic  development  programs  (Drabenstott,  2006).  When  comparing  the 
regional  economic  development  policies  of  these  two  economic  blocks,  one 
should keep in mind that the design and the size of these policies are very likely 
influenced  by  differences  in  the  blocks'  age,  origin,  institution  designs,  and 
economic and social culture. Thus, one could argue that the US policy is more 
limited  than  its  European  counterpart  because  interstate  inequality  has  been 
relatively low, whereas the EU uses its regional policy to compensate member 
states for the “widening” and the “deepening” of European integration (Allen, 
2005; Molle, 2007). A more rigorous econometric analysis would be necessary 
to identify the effects of regional policies on interregional inequality and the 
causality direction between these two variables. 
 
 
3.  INEQUALITY VARIATIONS 
  
3.1.  Decomposition of inequality between and within countries 
  
The  conventional  inequality  measures  used  in  section  2  capture  the 
overall spread of regional income distribution. In addition to variation across 
economic  systems  and  over  time,  inequality  among  OECD  regions  can  be 
further  analyzed  by  distinguishing  inequality  within  and  between-countries 
belonging  to  the  same  economic  system.  From  this  exercise,  we  can  infer 
whether  the  relative  importance  of  the  within  and  between  components  of 
regional  income  inequality  varies  with  the  level  of  economic  integration. 
Inequality decompositions is also helpful to analyze changes in income ine-
quality over time. 
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It  is  intuitively  appealing  to  have  an  inequality  measure  that  allows 
overall inequality to be expressed as the sum of inequality within- and between-
groups, for instance within and between countries:  within between total I I I  =  (see 
appendix D). Not all inequality indices are additively decomposable. Shorrocks 
(1980, 1984) shows that the only additively decomposable inequality measures 
that also satisfy a set of desirable axioms (mentioned in section 2) are General 




For  the  USA,  this  inequality  decomposition  can  only  be  done  if  the 
country's  states  partitioned  into  subgroups.  I  use  the  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis (BEA)'s 9 regions (see appendix E) to decompose interstate income 
inequality.  Because  the  shares  of  within  and  between  inequality  have  not 
significantly changed over the period covered in the study, their average values 
for each economic system are presented in table 2. At this stage of the paper, it 
is important to keep in mind that the use of national price data to compute 
regional PPP GDP might result in underestimating PPP GDP in poorer regions 
(where  prices  tend  to  be  lower),  and  thus  in  overestimating  within-country 
inequality. 
 
Table  2: GE(1) index decomposition 
  
       average value  share in GE(1) index 
OECD regions 
 Within   0.0323  29.49 
 Between   0.0771  70.51 
 Total GE(1)   0.1094  100.00 
 NAFTA regions  
 Within   0.0476  24.84 
 Between   0.1439  75.16 
 Total GE(1)   0.1915  100.00 
European Union 
regions  
 Within   0.0234  66.82 
 Between   0.0116  33.18 
 Total GE(1)   0.0350  100.00 
 EMU regions  
 Within   0.0252  64.86 
 Between   0.0137  35.14 
 Total GE(1)   0.0388  100.00 
 USA states  
 Within         0.0970  64.67 
 Between   0.0053  35.33 
 Total GE(1)         0.0150  100.00 
Source: elaboration on data from OECD Regional Statistics. 
 
The decomposition yields different results for lower levels of economic 
integration  than  for  economic  systems  with  deeper  economic  and  political 
integration. Among OECD regions and NAFTA regions, 3/4 of inequality exists 
between  countries  instead  of  within  countries.  In  more  integrated  economic 
systems (EU, EMU, and the USA), 65% of inequality stem from inequality 
                                                 
6I checked the robustness of the results presented in this section by performing the same analysis 
with the GE(0) index, and the results were very similar and therefore are not reported.      Région et Développement  49 
 
within countries/BEA regions
7. Why is inequality within countries relatively so 
large? Predictions of the neoclassical model are based on the  assumptions of 
perfect competition and free factor mobility. Thus, deeper economic integration 
might have facilitated factor mobility between countries and increased inter -
national  competition,  but  might  not  have  affected  competition  and  factor 
mobility within countries. This would be especially true for European countries 
which are still characterized by rigid labor markets, and low interregional labor 
mobilities. Using a simple NEG model, Martin  (2005) argues that economic 
integration causes a reduction of international trade cost but no change in trade 
cost between regions of the same country. Due to the combination of national 
institutional features (such as a national minimum wage law which prevents 
labor  costs  to  be  even  smaller  in  poorer  regions)  with   this  reduction  of 
international  trade  cost,  “poor  regions  cannot  exploit  their  comparative 
advantage relative to rich regions as well as poor countries can exploit their 
comparative advantage relative to rich countries” (Martin, 2005; page 2). 
 
3.2.  Rank-size function: Zipf's law applied to regional income distribution 
 
The  decomposition  performed  in  section  3.1  suggests  that  inequality 
between countries is much lower than among regions from the same country for 
the EU and US states, but not for NAFTA regions. Besides changing with the 
size of the geographic units (countries or regions) considered, inequality can 
also vary among groups of regions depending on these regions' positions in the 
income distribution. The rank-size function describes the relationship between 
the size and rank of observations arranged in a descending order according to 
size (Zipf, 1949). In the context of this paper, a region's size is captured by its 
real PPP per capita income, so that the wealthiest region in the sample has a 
rank equal to one and the poorest region has a rank equal to 304. While the 
rank-size function is rarely used to study income inequality (with the exception 
of Fan and Casetti, 1994, Gallegati and Clementi, 2005, 2006), this technique is 
usually applied in urban economics where cities are ranked according to their 
populations in order to assess the level of urban concentration (Gabaix, 1999; 
Brakman et al., 1999; Midelfart et al., 2003; Krugman, 1996; Nitsche, 2005). 
The  inequality  measure  derived  from  the  rank-size  function,  the  power  law 
exponent, is the coefficient b  obtained by regressing logged regional per capita 
income,  t i y ,  on logged rank,  t i r , : 
 
t i t i r b a y , , ln = ln                                                                                             (1) 
 
The power law exponent evaluates the degree of income concentration in 
a system of regions, and corresponds graphically to the slope of the rank-size 
curve. This rank-size function provides only a measure of the overall inequality, 
because it assumes that inequality between all of the regions follows the same 
law. A more negative value of the exponent indicates greater overall inequality 
                                                 
7As noted in Rey (2001), the results of the decomposition of US inequality in its between and 
within components vary with the chosen partitioning scheme: the within-region component tend 
to be smaller when the decomposition is calculated with BEA regions (65% of total inequality) 
than with Census regions (90% of total inequality) or divisions. 50   Florence Bouvet 
 
 
across regions. The average values of the power law exponent presented in table 
3 confirm that inequality tends to be lower in more integrated economic systems 
(such as the US and the EU). 
 
Figure  3: Rank-size Plots 
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(e)                                                                (f) 
 
Source: elaboration on data from OECD Regional Statistics. 
 
If inequality was similar throughout the income distribution, points on the 
scatterplot  would  form  a  straight  line,  with a  slope  equal to  the  power  law 
exponent. Yet, when logged regional PPP per capita incomes are plotted against 
logged ranks (figure 3), the slope (i.e. the power-law exponent) tends to be lar-
(c)                                                                (d) 
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ger for lower ranks (for poorer regions). This implies that, like for U.S. states 
(Fan and Casetti, 1994), inequality is higher among low-income regions. This is 
especially true for the system including all of the OECD regions (figure 3(b)) 
and  NAFTA  regions  (figure  3(c))  because  Mexican  regions  are  among  the 
poorest regions in the sample (2/3 of Mexican regions consistently rank in the 
bottom 10% of the distribution of OECD regions, and all of Mexico's regions 
are poorer than their Canadian and US counterparts in NAFTA). 
 
Table  3: Power Law Exponent      
Economic System  Power Law Exponent 
averaged over 1997-2004 
NAFTA   -0.680 
OECD regions   -0.454 
OECD countries   -0.405 
EMU   -0.273 
EU   -0.257 
USA   -0.207 
 Source: elaboration on data from OECD Regional Statistics. 
 
3.3.  Expansions of the rank-size function 
 
This non-linear relationship between a region's rank and per capita inco-
me can be further studied by expanding the rank-size equation. (Fan and Casetti. 
1994) suggest making the slope of the rank-size function a function of the rank 
and the time trend, so that the rank-size specification can be rewritten as: 
 




02 , 01 , 00 , ln ln ln ln = ~ ln  








, 10 ln ln ln ln                (2) 
 
 where  t i y ,
~  is the regional income expressed as a fraction of the income of the 
richest region in each economic system in the corresponding year
8, t  is the time 
trend, and  t i r ,  is the regional rank. The original power -law exponent  b  from 













02 01 00 = t r b t r b t r b r b t b t b t b b b t i t i t i t i                              (3) 
 
         Substituting for  t  in equation 3 each year and taking the average of the 
power  law  exponent  (b )  between  1997  and  2004,  I  illustrate  variation  in 
inequality by rank in figure 4. To ease the interpretation, I represent inequality 
measured as  b   since a more negative value implies higher inequality across 
regions. For all of the economic systems, inequality is higher among the poorest 
regions (with a lower rank), as already noted in figure 3. This finding can be 
interpreted  as  cross-section  evidence  of  Kuznet's  inverted  U  relationship 
between economic development (measured by the level of per capita income) 
and regional income inequality, especially for NAFTA since Mexican regions 
                                                 
8As explained in Fan and Casetti (1994), this transformation helps reducing the complexity of the 
model and to focus the analysis on changes in inequality rather than on changes in income. 52   Florence Bouvet 
 
 
have per capita incomes significantly lower that those of their US or Canadian 
counterparts. It also provides some evidence for Martin (2005)'s argument that 
poorer  regions  are  falling  further  behind  because  they  cannot  exploit  their 
comparative  advantage  relative  to  richer  regions,  owing  to  some  national 
institutional features (notably labor market institutions) that prevent these poor 
regions to improve their national cost advantage relative to richer regions from 
the same country. 
 
 Figure  4: Changes in inequality with rank 
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To  examine  the  relation  between  economic  integration  and  regional 
income  inequality,  I  compare  the  levels  and  trends  of  inequality  in  four 
economic  systems  which  have  reached  different  integration  levels:  the  US 
states, EMU, the EU, and NAFTA. Overall, inequality tends to be lower among 
regions that belong to a deeper integration process, such as the political union 
formed  by  US  states  or  EMU.  This  stylized  fact  thus  provides  empirical 
substance  to  the  neoclassical  theory.  The  analysis  of  interregional  income 
inequality based on the rank-size function suggests that inequality tends to be 
larger among low-income regions than among their richer counterparts, which 
provides  some  cross-section  evidence  of  Kuznet's  inverted  U  relationship 
between economic development (measured by the level of per capita income) 
and regional income inequality. 
 
The  increase  in  inequality  within  the  USA  and  the  decomposition  of 
inequality in its between and within-country components yet cast some doubts 
on the neoclassical predictions. Indeed, in more integrated economic systems 
(the USA and the EU), most of the inequality among European regions and US 
states exists within European countries and BEA regions respectively, where 
potential forces of convergence (such as labor and capital mobility) are likely to 
be  stronger.  How  could  the  neoclassical  theory  then  be  reconciled  with  the 
persistence  of  interregional  inequality  within  countries?  Predictions  of  the 
neoclassical model are based on the assumptions of perfect competition and free 
factor mobility. Thus, deeper economic integration might have facilitated factor 
mobility between countries and increased international competition by lowering 
international trade cost, but might not have affected competition/trade cost and 
factor mobility within countries. This would be especially true for European 
countries  which  are  still  characterized  by  rigid  labor  markets,  and  low 
interregional labor mobilities. As a result, deeper economic integration might 
have helped decrease inequality among countries but not within countries. 
 
Insofar as the analysis conducted in this paper offers only stylized facts 
about interregional inequality within different economic systems and does not 
control for other factors that could affect inequality (such as regional redistri-
butive  policies,  asymmetric  economic  shocks,  sectoral  shifts...),  it  does  not 
allow us to draw strong conclusions on the impact of economic integration on 
interregional  inequality.  In  the  case  of  the  USA  for  instance,  because  the 
construction of the United States as a political union is far much older than the 
period studied in this paper, the observed increasing inequality may have been 
caused  by  other  factors,  such  as  the  participation  of  the  USA  into  another 
economic block (i.e. NAFTA), sectoral shifts, or the geographic concentration 
of certain industries (such as high-tech industry in the Silicon Valley, and long 
Route 128 in Boston). As the current theoretical debate continues, much more 
empirical  work  needs  to  be  carried  out  before  we  can  truly  grasp  the  rela-
tionship  between  economic  integration  and  interregional  income  inequality. 
Further research should therefore aim at disentangling all the possible factors 
that could affect interregional income disparities, to better assess the impact of 
economic integration. 




   
A. Countries and Regions List 
   
Country  number of 
regions  Country  number of 
regions 
AUS: Australia   8   LUX: Luxembourg   1 
AUT: Austria   9   MEX: Mexico   32 
BEL: Belgium   3   NLD: Netherlands   4 
CAN: Canada   12   NOR: Norway   7 
CZE: Czech Republic   8   POL: Poland   16 
DNK: Denmark   3   PRT: Portugal   7 
FIN: Finland   5   SVK: Slovak Republic   4 
FRA: France   22   KOR: Korea   7 
DEU: Germany   16   ESP: Spain   19 
GRC: Greece   4   SWE: Sweden   8 
HUN: Hungary   7   CHE: Switzerland   7 
IRL: Ireland   2   GBR: United Kingdom   12 
ITA: Italy   21   USA: United States   50 
JPN: Japan   10      
 
B. Five Axioms an Inequality Measure Should Meet 
    
     the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: income transfer from a poorer region 
to a richer region should register as an increase (or at least not a decrease) 
in inequality.  
     Income scale independence: the inequality measure should not change if 
all regions' incomes change in the same proportion.  
     Principle  of  population:  inequality  measure  should  be  invariant  to 
replications of the population: merging two identical income distributions 
should not change the inequality measure.  
     Symmetry: inequality is independent of any other regional characteristics 
besides regional income.  
     Decomposability: overall inequality should be related to inequality for 
subgroups,  so  that  if  inequality  increases  in  all  of  the  population 
subgroups, overall inequality should also increase.  
 
C.  Inequality Measures: Formulas 
    













Gini                                                                               (4) 
  
where  = i y  real wage in region i ;  = y  the average wage across all of 
the regions;  = n  the number of regions included in the sample. 
 
The Gini coefficient takes on values between zero and one, with zero 
interpreted as no inequality.  
 
     Generalized Entropy index with parameter 1  














1 =                                                                                    (5) 
 where  = i y  real wage in region  i ;  = y  the average wage across all of the 
regions;  = n  the number of regions included in the sample. 
 
Generalized Entropy measures take values between zero and  ,  with 
zero representing perfect equality.  
 
D.  Decomposition of the GE(1) Index 
  
The  GE(1)  index  can  be  decomposed  in  within  and  between-group 
inequalities. If the  n regions are divided into G  groups (here countries), k  is 
the  number  of  regions  in each  group (country)  and  g s  is  the  wage  share  of 
group (country)  g,  g T  is the GE(1) index for that group, and  g y  is the average 













1 = 1 =                                                                                     (6) 
 
 where  G  is the number of countries;  n  is the total number of regions;  k   is 
the number of regions in country  g ;  y  is the overall average real wage;  g y  is 
the average real wage in country  g , 























 The first term in Equation 6 measures within-country inequality, and the 
second term is a weighted sum of between-country inequality. 
 
E.  BEA Regions 
   
REGION  STATES 
 New England Region   Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
 Mideast Region   Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania 
 Great Lakes Region   Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
 Plains Region  Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
 Southeast Region 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,  
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,  
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia 
 Southwest Region  Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
 Rocky Mountain Region  Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming 
 Far West Region  Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, 
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LES IMPLICATIONS D'UNE PLUS GRANDE INTÉGRATION 
ÉCONOMIQUE SUR LES INÉGALITÉS RÉGIONALES DE REVENUS : 
UNE ANALYSE DES RÉGIONS ET DES PAYS DE L'OCDE 
 
Résumé  -  Cet  article  propose  de  comparer  l’évolution  des  disparités 
régionales de revenu au sein de différentes zones d’intégration économique 
en considérant 304 régions des 27 pays de l'OCDE entre 1995 et 2005. De 
façon générale, les inégalités régionales de revenu sont plus faibles aux 
Etats-Unis  et  dans  les  régions  de  l'Union  monétaire  et  économique 
européenne que dans les régions de l’Union européenne ou dans les régions 
de  l’ALENA.  Les  inégalités  régionales  de  revenu  semblent,  donc,  être 
négativement liées à l'intégration économique. Cependant, ces inégalités ont 
augmenté  aux  Etats-Unis,  tandis  qu'elles  sont  restées  stables  dans  les 
régions de l'OCDE et ont diminué dans les régions européennes. La relation 
rang-taille suggère que ces inégalités sont plus fortes entre les régions à 
faible revenu qu'entre les régions à revenu élevé. 